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COMMENTARY

EC REGULATION OF THE BANKING
SECTOR*
Wendy Fowler**
INTRODUCTION

The removal of the barriers to the provision of banking and financial services throughout Europe has become one of the main
objectives of the European Community ("EC"). The liberalization of
the banking sector is an area in which much European legislation
has concentrated in recent years. The reason for according a high
priority to the area of banking is, perhaps, that the creation of a
unified banking market in Europe is seen as an important stage in
the achievement of one of the central aims of the EC - the economic and monetary union in Europe.
Economic and monetary union ("EMU") essentially involves a
three-stage process. The first stage envisages full liberalization of
capital movements and increasing cooperation between Member
States in the area of economic and monetary policy. The second
stage centers on the gradual shift of decision-making from a national
level to a community level along with the establishment of a European System of Central Banks to initiate the move towards EC-wide
decision making in the area of monetary policy. The third stage contemplates an irrevocable move to lock exchange rates, the replacement of national currencies with a single European currency, and the
* This article was written prior to the recent enactment of certain banking provisions
which are described herein as anticipatory. As
implementation of the EC banking regulations
** The author is an Admitted Solicitor
London, England, and specializing in Banking

such, some of the descriptions of the planned
have already been executed.
(1987) practicing law with Richards Butler,
and Finance.
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empowerment of the EC to interfere with national budgets. The first
stage has already been largely implemented. The changes anticipated by implementation of the second and third stages are controversial because there are obvious implications for national sovereignty, and, for this reason, the second and third stages may not be
implemented for some time.
Certainly, events surrounding the Exchange Rate Mechanism
("ERM") which occurred in 1992 suggest that completion of the
second and third stages of EMU may be a long way off. The ERM is
an attempt by Member States to achieve exchange rate stability in
the EC and, as such, is an important step towards the irrevocable
locking of exchange rates under the third stage of EMU. The ERM
operates by its members pegging their respective exchange rates and
agreeing to limit movement within those rates to certain narrow
bands. Membership in the ERM inevitably involves some loss of economic autonomy for the Member States because their ability to use
interest rates as .part of their economic policy becomes limited. Some
members have been forced to maintain their interest rates at very
high levels in order to keep their currencies within the ERM bands
at a time when their economies would benefit greatly from sharp
cuts in interest rates. In some cases, high interest rates have not been
sufficient to maintain the ERM exchange rate parities - for instance, Ireland's decision to raise its overnight lending rate to 50%
in January 1993 was insufficient to prevent a 10% devaluation of the
Irish punt within the ERM later that month. In September 1992,
both the United Kingdom and Italy suspended their currencies from
the ERM, and since then Spain and Portugal have devalued their
currencies within the ERM.
The recent devaluations and suspensions of currencies in the
ERM have illustrated that there are considerable divergences between the economies of the various Member States. It has been suggested that, in economic terms at least, there are two tiers of Member States within the EC. The premier league is comprised of
Germany, France, the Benelux countries and perhaps Denmark. The
lower tier consists of Member States, such as the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and Spain, which are perceived to have weaker economies
and whose currencies regularly come under pressure. By way of illustration, the increased pressure on the sterling, which resulted in
its withdrawal from the ERM in September 1992, was fueled in part
by the weakened state of the economy of the United Kingdom. This
situation, combined with high German interest rates, caused a run
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on the sterling in favor of the Deutschemdrk. Recent newspaper reports have suggested that pressure within the ERM may now switch
to the French franc. It remains to be seen whether France is sufficiently committed to the ERM to be prepared to sustain high interest rates in order to protect its currency at a time when its economy
is in recession.
The European Currency Unit ("ECU"), which is referred to a
number of times below, is a unit of account used throughout EC
legislation relating to banking. It is composed of a "basket" of specified amounts of the currencies of each of the Member States in the
EC. Those amounts are revised from time to time. In recent years,
there have been an increasing number of bond and note issues in
Europe which are denominated in ECU, and it is quite common for
banks to make loans available in ECU. It may be interesting to note
that the ECU is also a contender for adoption as the single European
currency, should the third stage of EMU be implemented. The adoption of a single European currency (whether it is the ECU or one of
the other currencies of the EC) would involve a very decisive step
towards economic union in the EC because it would require Member
States to relinquish their currencies in favor of the single currency.
Some Member States are reluctant to take such a step because they
regard the loss of their currencies as a blow to their national
identity.
Despite the reservations of certain Member States about EMU,
considerable progress has been made in the liberalization of the
banking sector. That progress was marked in December 1989 by the
adoption of what is commonly referred to as the Second Banking
Directive.1 The Second Banking Directive demonstrates a change of
strategy in the way in which the EC has approached the liberalization of banking in Europe. Whereas the EC had previously concentrated on harmonization of national laws, the approach embodied in
the Second Banking Directive centers on the concept of the single
banking license. This would enable banks established in one Member
State to establish branches and to provide a wide range of services
throughout the EC. The concept of the single banking license is un1. Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15th December 1989 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions, amending the Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (amended
First Council Directive of 12th December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive).
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derpinned by three principles: (1) that the law and practice relating
to banks should be harmonized across Member States; (2) that there
should be mutual recognition by national supervisory authorities of
the controls operated by each other; and (3) that home country control, i.e. supervision of banks, including branches in other Member
States, should be undertaken by the supervisory authorities of the
Member State where the bank is authorized.
The purpose of this commentary is to examine the Second
Banking Directive and to look at complementary legislation in the
field of banking which is intended to support the Second Banking
Directive.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM FOR REGULATION OF
BANKS

Before considering the Second Banking Directive in detail, it
may be useful to look at the background to the attempts to create a
unified banking market in Europe. The starting point is the Treaty
of Rome 1957.2 Article 2 of the Treaty describes the task of the EC
as follows:
[B]y establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities,
a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relationships
between the States belonging to it.'
Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the progressive
abolition of restrictions on the freedom of nationals of one Member
State to establish themselves in the territory of another Member
State.4 "Freedom of establishment" is defined specifically to include
the right to set up and manage undertakings under the same conditions as those applying to nationals of the country where such establishment is to be effected. There is a similar requirement relating to
the provision of services in Article 59 of the Treaty of Rome. This
contemplates the progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedom
of nationals of one Member State to provide services within the EC
to persons in other Member States.5
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING
3. EEC TREATY art. 2.
4. EEC TREATY art. 52.
5. EEC TREATY art. 59.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

[EEC

TREATY].
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In 1985, a report was issued by the Commission which revealed
that little progress had been made over the previous three decades
towards the removal of the barriers to free trade within the EC. It
was recognized that something needed to be done to accelerate
change within the EC. This resulted in the signature of the Single
European Act by all the Member States in 1986.6
The Single European Act of 1986 amended the Treaty of Rome
by adding a new Article 8(a), providing for the completion of the
process of creating an internal market by December 31, 1992. The
"internal market" is defined as "an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is
ensured in accordance with the provisions of [the] Treaty."
Prior to the Single European Act of 1986, progress in the area
of banking had been slow. Early Directives relating to the banking
and capital sectors placed emphasis on "host country" control, i.e.
branches of banks established in one Member State should be authorized and regulated by the authorities in the Member State where
the branch was established. The activities of such branches were restricted to those which a domestic bank of the host State could conduct. Directive 73/1837 required certain Member States to abolish
discriminatory requirements relating to foreign branches of banks,
such as capital requirements which were more onerous than those
applying to domestic banks. However, this Directive made no attempt to coordinate the laws of the various Member States.
The first step towards creating a unified banking market was
taken in 1977, in what is known as the First Banking Directive.8 The
First Banking Directive applies to "credit institutions" which are defined as undertakings whose business it is to receive deposits or other
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for their own
account. "Credit institutions" should, for the purposes of EC legislation, be distinguished from "financial institutions" which do not accept deposits, but which conduct some or all of the activities associated with banks such as granting credit and taking participations.
The First Banking Directive set out minimum conditions to be
6. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169).
7. Council Directive 73/183 of 28th June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of
banks and other financial institutions, 1973 O.J. (L 194) 1.
8. First Council Directive 77/780 of 12th December 1977 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
for credit institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30 [hereinafter First Banking Directive].
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met before credit institutions could be authorized to operate by
Member States. The Directive permitted the granting of authorization only if the credit institution possessed each of the following: (1)
its own capital, separate from the resources of its head office; (2)
adequate minimum own funds; and (3) at least two persons of sufficient repute and experience effectively directing its business. However, meeting these requirements did not ensure automatic authorization in other Member States since it did not prevent Member
States from imposing more stringent conditions. Member States
were permitted to make the establishment of a branch of a credit
institution with its head office in another Member State subject to
the law and procedures of the host Member State. The First Banking Directive did, however, provide for coordination and collaboration between the supervisory authorities of Member States.
Directive 83/3501 was a step in the direction of "home country"
control. This Directive created a system for the consolidated supervision of credit institutions owning 25 % or more of the capital of other
credit and financial institutions. Such supervision to be exercised by
the authorities of the country in which the head office of the credit
institution owning the capital was situated.
II.

THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE

The crucial piece of legislation in the field of European banking
regulation is the Second Banking Directive. 0 This was adopted in
December 1989 and Member States are required to implement it
into their national legislation by January 1993. This directive covers
a full range of financing activities, as the following list evidences:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the
public;
2. Lending;
3. Financial leasing;
4. Money transmission services;
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards,
travelers' cheques and bankers' drafts);
6. Guarantees and commitments;
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, c.d.s, etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
9. Council Directive 83/350 of 13th June 1983 on the supervision of credit institutions
on a consolidated basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18.
10. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1.
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(c) financial futures and options;
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments;
(e) transferable securities;
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services related
to such issues;
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy
and related questions and advice, and services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings;
10. Money brokering;
11. Portfolio management and advice;
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities;
13. Credit reference services;
14. Safe custody services; including, inter alia:
- consumer credit,
- mortgage lending,
- factoring, with or without recourse,
- financing of commercial transactions (including forfeiting)."1
The directive also seeks to abolish any remaining restrictions
on the freedom to establish branches of credit institutions and to
provide banking services throughout the EC. The crux of the proposal is the single banking license, enabling banks authorized in
one Member State to establish themselves via branches in other
Member States, without being subject to further significant regulatory constraints. The wide range of permitted activities provided by
the Second Banking Directive allows banks to transact in other
Member States, once authorized by their home supervisor with respect to those activities. However, the Second Banking Directive
does not confer that same freedom of establishment to subsidiaries
of banks authorized in other Member States, as opposed to
branches of banks authorized in other Member States. Subsidiaries, as opposed to branches, are required to obtain authorization
from the host State in which the subsidiary is to be established.
The rationale for this difference in treatment is, presumably, that a
branch is, in fact, the same legal entity as its parent, whereas a
subsidiary is a separate legal entity requiring separate authorization; the most logical place for that authorization to be given is the
Member State where the subsidiary is incorporated.
A.

Minimum Requirements for Authorization

The Second Banking Directive prohibits Member States from
granting authorization to a credit institution if the institution's initial
capital is less than ECU 5,000,000. There is, however, an exception
11.

Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, Annex.
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to that prohibition which permits Member States to grant authorization to particular categories of credit institutions whose initial capital
is at least ECU 1,000,000, provided that the Member State concerned complies with certain notice and reporting requirements set
out in the Second Banking Directive. Before granting authorization,
Member States are required to know the identity and the amount of
holdings of the shareholders or members of the credit institution who
have holdings representing 10% or more of the capital or voting
rights. The purpose of imposing minimum standards for authorizations is to ensure that those who deal with credit institutions are
afforded an adequate level of protection and to equate competitive
conditions throughout the community.
B.

Cross-Border Activities

The Second Banking Directive also provides that Member
States must permit within their territories the transaction of the activities listed in the Annex by a credit institution authorized in another Member State, provided that the credit institution's authorization covers such activities. A credit institution may carry on the
activities for which it is authorized in a Member State, other than in
its home Member State, either by establishment of a branch or by
the provision of services.
The formalities for carrying on banking activities in another
Member State vary, depending on whether the credit institution in
question wishes to establish a branch in that Member State or,
merely to provide services from the Member State in which it is already authorized. In the case of a credit institution wishing to establish a branch in another Member State, it must first notify the authorities of the Member State in which it is authorized and provide
those authorities with certain information prescribed by the Second
Banking Directive. The information to be provided covers such matters as the identity of the Member State in which the branch is to be
established, the types of business intended, the structural organization of the branch, and the names of the persons responsible for its
management. Provided that the authorities of the home Member
State do not doubt the adequacy of the administrative structure or
financial situation of the credit institution, they must communicate
the information provided by the credit institution to the authorities
of the host Member State. The amount of the credit institution's
own funds and solvency ratio must also be communicated to the host
Member State by the authorities, together with details of any de-
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posit-guarantee scheme intended to protect depositors in the branch.
The host Member State is required to prepare for supervision of
the credit institution within two months of receiving the information
provided by the home Member State and, if necessary, to indicate
the conditions under which, in the interest of the general good, the
activities concerned must be carried on in the host Member State.
Upon receipt of a communication from the host Member State or, in
the absence of a communication, on the expiration of two months
from the time the host Member State was provided with information
about the credit institution by the home Member State, the branch
may be established and commence its activities.
Where the credit institution wishes to engage in activities in another Member State by providing services from its home Member
State, it must notify the authorities of its home Member State of the
activities it intends to transact. The authorities of the home Member
State must then notify the authorities of the host Member State,
whereupon the credit institution may commence its activities.
Although the role of authorization and supervision will rest primarily with the home Member State, the host Member State will
retain a limited supervisory role. The authorities of the host Member
State may require all credit institutions having branches within its
territory to provide periodic reports for statistical purposes. They
may also punish breaches occurring with respect to matters falling
within the power of the host Member State under the Second Banking Directive. Additionally, there is a general power vested in host
Member States to prevent and punish irregularities which are contrary to legal rules adopted "in the interest of the general good" and
to adopt rules governing the form and content of advertising by
credit institutions "in the interest of the general good." Furthermore,
the Second Banking Directive provides for the host Member State to
retain responsibility for the supervision of the liquidity of branches
of credit institutions, in cooperation with the authorities of the home
Member State pending further coordination of laws. Host Member
States also retain responsibility for measures resulting from the implementation of their monetary policies, although such measures
must not discriminate against credit institutions authorized in other
Member States.
C. Reciprocity
The issue which caused the most controversy during the course
of the negotiation of the Second Banking Directive was that of reci-
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procity. Broadly, this means that banks from outside the EC might
not be permitted access into the EC unless EC institutions are themselves given reciprocal treatment in the home country of the particular bank. The original text of the Second Banking Directive proposed
a bureaucratic investigation system which would be triggered automatically whenever a bank from outside the EC sought entry to a
Member State. This provoked a very unfavorable reaction both from
within the EC, where the United Kingdom was concerned that such
a stipulation would threaten London's position as a financial center,
and from banks outside the EC, particularly the United States and
Japan which feared that the reciprocity provisions were designed to
create a "fortress Europe" from which they would be excluded. For
a time, it was unclear whether reciprocal treatment meant that
banks from the EC operating in third countries (i.e. non-EC countries) should enjoy identical privileges to those afforded to foreign
banks within the EC, or whether it simply meant that EC banks
operating in third countries should not be treated less favorably than
local banks in those countries. The issue has now been resolved by
revising the contentious provision of the Second Banking Directive so
that the EC may take retaliatory measures where EC banks do not
enjoy rights comparable to local banks in third countries. However,
there is still some latitude within the provision for the negotiation of
"comparable access," i.e., to procure the same freedom for banks
from the EC which operate in third countries as third country banks
enjoy in the EC.
The Second Banking Directive requires the authorities of Member States to inform the Commission of the authorization of a credit
institution which is a direct or indirect subsidiary of an undertaking
governed by the laws of a third country and, similarly, the acquisition by such an undertaking of a credit institution in the EC. Member States must also inform the Commission of, what is described as,
"any general difficulties encountered by their credit institutions in
establishing themselves or carrying on banking activities in a third
country."
The obligation to provide such information is tied in to the requirement that the Commission compile periodic reports on the
treatment accorded to EC credit institutions in third countries regarding establishment, the transaction of banking activities, and the
acquisition of holdings in third country credit institutions. If the
Commission considers that a third country is not granting EC credit
institutions access to its markets comparable with that granted by
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the EC to credit institutions from that third country, the Commission may apply to the Council of the European Community for a
mandate to negotiate comparable opportunities. If, however, the
Commission considers that EC credit institutions in a third country
are not offered the same opportunities as domestic credit institutions
in that country, the Commission may itself initiate negotiations with
the country concerned. Moreover, it may, at the same time, require
Member States to limit or suspend decisions regarding requests for
authorization from, or for the acquisition of holdings by, institutions
in third countries for a maximum period of three months. The Council is empowered to extend the period of limitation and suspension.
The Second Banking Directive provides that such limitation and suspension measures (whether by the Commission or the Council) will
not apply to those credit institutions or their subsidiaries duly authorized by one Member State which wish to either establish a subsidiary in the EC or to acquire a holding in a credit institution
within the EC.
D.

Limitations on Harmonization

The Second Banking Directive permits Member States to establish stricter rules than some of those enacted in the Second Banking
Directive itself - for instance, Member States are permitted to insist on initial capital in excess of the minimum of ECU 5,000,000, as
specified in the Second Banking Directive. Requirements regarding
notification of significant shareholdings in credit institutions, and
limitations on shareholdings held by credit institutions in undertakings which are neither credit institutions nor financial institutions are
examples of two other areas where Member States may impose more
stringent obligations on credit institutions than those set out in the
Second Banking Directive. This creates the possibility of credit institutions deliberately seeking authorization from a Member State
whose rules are more liberal. This possibility is considered by the
Second Banking Directive. One of its recitals requires Member
States to deny authorization, or to withdraw it, where it is clear that
a credit institution has opted for the legal system of one Member
State for the purpose of evading the stricter standards in force in
another Member State in which it intends to conduct the greater
part of its activities.
III.

COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION

It is intended that the Second Banking Directive will be sup-
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ported by a number of other complementary Directives which are
already in force or are under consideration. The following sections
describe such complementary legislation.
A.

Accounts

The annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and
other financial institutions within the EC are regulated by Directive
86/635.2 This Directive aims to coordinate the provisions relating to
the content, format, and layout of the accounts of credit and financial institutions in the different Member States. In light of the increased activity by banks across national borders, this is of particular
significance since it permits easy comparison of the accounts of various institutions and facilitates the task of regulating those institutions. This Directive applies to all banks whether incorporated or
not. It lays down specific provisions relating to the format of the
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of banks, as well as to the
items to be included within them. It also incorporates valuation rules
for assets and detailed requirements relating to the contents of notes
to the accounts. Additionally, the Directive requires publication of
annual accounts, consolidated accounts, annual reports, and consolidated annual reports of credit institutions.
Directive 89/11713 applies to branches of credit and financial
institutions established in a Member State which have their head
office outside the Member State. Such branches are obliged to comply with the requirements of Directive 86/635 relating to the publication of accounts and auditors' reports. Directive 89/117 further
provides for the accounts and reports to be drawn up and audited in
accordance with the laws of the Member State where the head office
of the credit or financial institution is situated. Additionally,
branches may not be required to publish annual accounts relating to
their own activities. Member States may, however, require branches
having their head offices in other Member States to provide additional information relating to matters such as their income and costs,
staff employed, claims and liabilities attributable to the branch, and
certain of their assets. The provisions relating to branches where the
12. Council Directive 86/635 of 8th December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions, 1986 O.J. (L 372) 1.
13. Council Directive 89/I 17 of 13th February 1989 on the obligations of branches of
credit institutions and financial institutions established in a Member State, having their head
offices outside that Member State, regarding the publication of annual accounting documents,
1989 O.J. (L 44) 40.
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head office is situated in non-EC countries are similarly broad, with
the accounts to be drawn up and audited in accordance with the
requirements of the third country. The host Member State may only
require the branch to publish annual accounts relating to its own
activities if the provisions of Directive 86/635 have not been complied with or if reciprocity does not exist with the third country.
B.

Winding-up

The Commission has proposed a Directive to coordinate the
rules relating to reorganization measures taken to safeguard or restore the financial situation of credit institutions and the winding-up
of credit institutions and deposit guarantee schemes. 1 ' The Proposed
Reorganization Directive places responsibility on the authorities of
the home Member State to decide on the implementation of reorganization measures of credit institutions and their branches. "Reorganization measures" are defined to cover measures intended to safeguard or restore the financial situation of a credit institution and, in
the case of the United Kingdom, to include powers of the Bank of
England to appoint investigators and to revoke authorization under
the Banking Act of 1987. These measures would be fully effective
against the authorities and creditors of branches situated in other
Member States, even where the host Member State does not provide
for such measures. Decisions taken by the authorities of the home
Member State would preclude the host Member State from taking
any reorganization measures unless the home Member State so decides. In the case of credit institutions with head offices outside the
EC, the host Member State would have the right to implement its
own reorganization measures unless an agreement to the contrary
has been concluded with a home country on the basis of the principle
of reciprocity.
The Proposed Reorganization Directive also provides that the
winding-up of credit institutions should be carried out in accordance
with the laws of the home Member State and in collaboration with
the authorities of the host Member State if the credit institution has
its head office within the EC. In the case of credit institutions having
their head office outside the EC, the winding-up procedures of the
host Member State would apply. Finally, the Proposed Reorganization Directive places an obligation on Member States to ensure that
14. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Reorganization and the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions and Deposit-Guaranty Schemes, 1988 O.J. (C
36) I [hereinafter Proposed Reorganization Directive].
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the deposit-guarantee schemes existing in their territory cover the
deposits of branches of institutions having their head offices in other
Member States.
The Proposed Reorganization Directive is still under consideration by the Council of the European Community and has been for
some time. As yet, there is no indication when it will be adopted.
C.

Own Funds

Own funds are an important yardstick for the authorities in assessing the solvency of credit institutions. In Directive 89/299 on
own funds, 15 own funds are described as the credit institution's own
capital which serves to absorb losses which are not matched by prospective profits of sufficient volume.
Directive 89/299 was amended in 1991 by Directive 91/63316
and again in 1992 by Directive 92/16.17 Directive 89/299 (as
amended) lays down certain elements which comprise a credit institution's own funds. These include paid up capital, reserves, value adjustments, fixed-term cumulative preference shares, subordinated
loan capital and other items at the free disposal of the credit institution. The Directive (as amended) imposes limits on the proportion of
certain items to be included as against other items.
Although Directive 89/299 leaves Member States with discretion as to the use of the items comprising own funds and the fixing of
lower ceilings within the maxima set down by the Directive, it
obliges Member States to take into consideration increased convergence with a view of ultimately achieving a common definition of
own funds.
A key change made by Directive 92/16 was to exempt Danish
mortgage cooperatives from the rules relating to the required level of
own funds for a limited period. The exemption was rendered necessary by the plans of the Danish government to convert the mortgage
cooperatives concerned into public limited companies.
D. Solvency Ratios
The Directive on solvency ratios

8

is complementary to the Sec-

15. Council Directive 89/299 of 17th April 1989 on the own funds of credit institutions,
1989 O.J. (L 124) 16.
16. Council Directive 91/633, 1991 O.J. (L 339) 48.
17. Council Directive 92/16, 1992 O.J. (L 75) 48.
18. Council Directive 89/647, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Ratio
Directive].
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ond Banking Directive. Solvency ratios are seen as playing a central
role in the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
The solvency ratio is calculated by referring to the credit institution's assets and off-balance sheet items weighted with different
degrees of risk (the "denominator"), as against the credit institution's own funds (the "numerator"). Asset and balance sheet items
are assigned risk weights, e.g. cash in hand has a nil weight, whereas
claims on central governments and central banks of countries which
are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") and which have not concluded lending arrangements with the International Monetary Fund have a 100%
weight.
The Solvency Ratio Directive provides that effective January 1,
1993, credit institutions will be required to maintain their ratios at a
level of at least eight percent. Credit institutions which fail to reach
eight percent by the deadline will be required to increase their ratios
in successive stages. Only temporary fluctuations from the required
level are permitted and adequate reasons for the fluctuation must be
given to the supervisory authorities.
E.

Large Exposures

The monitoring and control of risks or exposures are regarded
as crucial elements in the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In a Commission Recommendation published in December
1986,1 a large exposure was defined as an exposure to a client or a
group of connected clients whose value equals or exceeds fifteen percent of the credit institution's own funds. The Recommendation on
Large Exposures" suggested that large exposures should be reported
to the authorities at least annually and credit institutions should be
prohibited from incurring any exposure to a client or a group of connected clients when the percentage value exceeds forty percent of
own funds. Additionally, it recommended that credit institutions
should be precluded from incurring large exposures which in aggregate exceed 800% of own funds. The Recommendation on Large
Exposures further suggested that those limits should be exceeded
only in exceptional circumstances.
In March 1991, the Recommendation on Large Exposures was
19. Commission Recommendation 87/62 of 22nd December 1986 on monitoring and
controlling large exposures of credit institutions, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 10 [hereinafter Recommendation on Large Exposures].
20. Id.
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followed by a draft Directive on large risks.21 The draft Directive
represented a compromise between Member States such as the
United Kingdom, which already imposes a limit of twenty-five percent of own funds on loans to an individual customer, and other
Member States, which have ceilings of around forty percent.
The Directive on large risks was adopted in December 1992,
after considerable discussion, and will be implemented in stages.
This Directive mandates that beginning January 1, 1994, banks will
be subject to a forty percent ceiling on their loans to a single customer. On January 1, 1999, the ceiling for new loans will be reduced
to twenty-five percent of own funds, but the forty percent threshold
will still apply to existing credit lines until January 1, 2002. In addition, small German banks with an annual turnover of less than ECU
7,000,000 will be allowed to apply the forty percent ceiling to existing loans until January 1, 2007. There is also an exemption until
December 31, 1998 in the Directive on Large Risks for certain Portuguese loans. The Directive on Large Risks differs from the original
Commission Recommendation by requiring notification to the authorities of any loan exceeding ten percent (as opposed to fifteen percent) of own funds and by limiting exposures to a client or group of
connected clients to twenty-five percent of own funds. However, the
overall limit on large exposures of 800%, which was set out in the
Recommendation, has been carried through into the Directive on
Large Risks.
F.

Consolidated Supervision

On April 6, 1992, the Council adopted the Second Consolidated
Supervision Directive.2 2 This Directive widens the basis of consolidated supervision provided for in Directive 83/350 to banking groups
where the parent is not a credit institution. The Second Consolidated
Supervision Directive is seen as a means of ensuring the harmonious
application of the rules relating to credit institutions established by
other EC legislation and, in particular, Directive 89/299 on own
funds.
The Second Consolidated Supervision Directive distinguishes
three categories of parent undertakings: parent undertakings which
are themselves credit institutions; parent undertakings which are fi21. Council Directive 92/121, 1992 O.J. (L 29) 1 [hereinafter Directive on Large
Risks].
22. Council Directive 92/30, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52 (hereinafter Second Consolidated
Supervision Directive].
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nancial institutions and whose subsidiary undertakings are exclusively or mainly credit or financial institutions (referred to as "financial holding companies"); and parent undertakings which are neither
credit institutions nor financial institutions, but whose subsidiaries
include at least one credit institution (known as "mixed-activity
holding companies").
The Second Consolidated Supervision Directive provides that
where a parent undertaking is a credit institution, the authorities in
the Member State authorizing it shall exercise the powers of consolidated supervision. Similarly, where the parent of a credit institution
is a financial holding company, consolidated supervision is to be carried out by the Member State which authorized the credit institution. Where two credit institutions authorized in different Member
States share the same financial holding company as their parent and
one of them is authorized in the same Member State as the parent,
the Member State where the parent is authorized shall be responsible for consolidated supervision. If, however, the credit institutions
and the parent are authorized in separate Member States, the Second Consolidated Supervision Directive provides for the various
Member States to seek to reach an agreement on which Member
State should supervise on a consolidated basis.
The position in relation to mixed-activity holding companies and
their credit institution subsidiaries is rather different because the
Second Consolidated Supervision Directive provides for the Member
State in which the credit institution subsidiary is authorized to approach the mixed-activity holding company for information to enable
it to supervise the credit institution subsidiary. The information supplied may be verified by on-the-spot inspections.
The Second Consolidated Supervision Directive also provides for
the negotiation of agreements with third countries relating to the
consolidated supervision of credit institutions whose parent undertakings have head offices in third countries and credit institutions situated in third countries whose parent undertakings have their head
offices in the EC. Furthermore, this Directive provides that it is to be
implemented by January 1, 1993, whereupon Directive 83/350 will
be repealed.
G.

Deposit-GuaranteeSchemes

In December 1986, the Commission issued a Recommendation
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relating to deposit-guarantee schemes.2" This Recommendation provided that Member States should ensure that their deposit-guarantee
schemes fulfill certain conditions to cover situations where a credit
institution is wound-up with insufficient assets. One of the conditions
was that the scheme should cover the depositors of credit institutions
operating in that Member State but which have their head office in
another Member State. The Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation
suggested that Member States which did not operate a scheme
should be required to implement one by January 1, 1990.
The Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation was followed in 1992
by a Commission proposal for a Directive on deposit-guarantee
schemes.2 4 By that stage, the collapse of Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") had emphasized the need for comprehensive deposit-guarantee schemes, and only ten of the twelve Member States had deposit-guarantee schemes which complied with the
earlier Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation.
The Proposed Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes provides
for each Member State to ensure that a deposit-guarantee scheme is
introduced in its territory which applies to all credit institutions authorized in that Member State. The scheme must cover depositors of
branches created by such credit institutions in other Member States.
The Proposed Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes permits
branches of credit institutions to apply voluntarily to join a scheme
in the Member State in which it is established, to supplement the
cover provided by the scheme in the Member State in which its head
office is situated.
Moreover, the Proposed Directive on Deposit-Guarantee
Schemes enables Member States to stipulate that branches of credit
institutions whose head offices are outside the EC must join a deposit-guarantee scheme in the Member State, provided that the
scheme must not accord to such branches more favorable treatment
than is accorded to branches of credit institutions with their head
offices within the EC.
It is proposed that schemes should provide minimum cover of at
least ninety percent of each depositor's aggregate deposits up to an
overall limit of ECU 15,000, and that payment should be made to
depositors within three months of the deposits becoming unavailable.
23. Commission Recommendation 87/63, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 16 [hereinafter DepositGuarantee Recommendation].
24. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1992
O.J. (C 163) 6 [hereinafter Proposed directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes].
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The Proposed Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes provides that
the Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes must be implemented by
January 1, 1994.
H.

Mortgages

In 1985, the Commission proposed a Directive which would remove restrictions on credit institutions undertaking mortgage business throughout the EC.2 The Proposed Directive on Mortgage
Credit was intended to apply to credit institutions which engage in
mortgage credit activities, i.e., those which receive funds from the
public and which provide loans to the public secured by land for the
purpose of acquiring, retaining, or improving property. However, the
Proposed Directive on Mortgage Credit has been largely overshadowed by the Second Banking Directive which also deals with mortgage credit and may, therefore, be dropped entirely from the legislation program.

I. Investment Services
As part of its attempts to create a unified financial market
throughout the EC, the Commission has proposed a Directive in the
field of investment services. 2 This Proposed Directive closely parallels the Second Banking Directive. It applies to investment firms
which are defined in the Directive as "any natural or legal person
whose business it is to provide any investment service." "Investment
services" are listed in the Annex to the Proposed Directive on Investment Services and include brokerage in financial instruments on behalf of clients, dealing in such instruments as principal, market making, portfolio management, underwriting, investment advice, and
custody services.
There is a clear overlap with the Second Banking Directive. The
Second Banking Directive contemplates that, under its provisions,
credit institutions may be authorized by Member States to engage in
activities which fall within the list of investment services. This is recognized by the Proposed Directive on Investment Services which provides, in Article 2, that, in the case of credit institutions authorized
25. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Freedom of Establishment and
the Free Supply of Services in the Field of Mortgage Credit, 1985 O.J. (C 42) 4 [hereinafter
Proposed Directive on Mortgage Credit].
26. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in
the Securities Field, 1990 O.J. (C 42) 7 [hereinafter Proposed Directive on Investment
Services].
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by their banking license to engage in securities business, only Articles 9(2), 11 and 13 of the Proposed Directive on Investment Services will apply. These provisions relate to such matters as the following: freedom of access to stock exchanges and securities' markets
in the Member State where the branch of the investment firm is
established; the requirement by home Member States to make sufficient provision against market risk; and the application of prudential
rules by home Member States in areas such as administrative and
accounting procedures.
The procedure for obtaining authorization is very similar to that
contained in the Second Banking Directive. Investment firms which
are not authorized to provide investment services under the Second
Banking Directive are required to obtain authorization from their
home Member State before providing such services. Before granting
authorization, the authorities of the home Member State are required to be satisfied with the level of the investment firm's initial
capital and the reputation and experience of the persons directing its
business. Once authorized, the investment firm may provide the investment services for which it is authorized in its home Member
State to persons in other Member States either by establishing a
branch in the host Member State or by provision of cross border
services. In each case, the Proposed Directive on Investment Services
sets out a procedure to be followed by the investment firm. The procedures are similar to those provided for in the Second Banking Directive. As in the case of the Second Banking Directive, the procedures relating to the establishment of a branch are more extensive
than those for the provision of cross border services.
J.

Capital Adequacy

The Commission has proposed a draft Directive on capital adequacy.2 7 Although it is aimed mainly at investment firms which are
not banks, it generally affects credit institutions, albeit to a limited
extent.
Non-bank investment firms, holding clients' money and/or securities, which receive, transmit, or execute customers' orders, or
which manage individual portfolios are required to have an initial
capital of ECU 100,000. However, this requirement only exists if
they do not deal in any financial instruments for their own account,
27. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, 1992 O.J. (C 50) 5 [hereinafter Proposed Directive on
Capital Adequacy].
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nor underwrite issues on a firm commitment basis. Where a firm is
not authorized to hold clients' money or securities, nor to deal for its
own account or to underwrite issues, the required level of initial capital may be reduced to ECU 50,000. The Proposed Directive on
Capital Adequacy stipulates that all other investment firms will require an initial capital of ECU 500,000.
This Proposed Directive contains detailed technical requirements for investment firms and credit institutions in areas such as
risk provisions and the monitoring and control of large exposures.
However, supervisory authorities are given the option of applying the
Solvency Ratio Directive to investment firms' trading book business,
rather than the Proposed Directive on Capital Adequacy, provided
that the business concerned does not normally exceed five percent of
the particular firm's business, nor the amount of ECU 15,000,000.
The progress of the Proposed Directive on Capital Adequacy
has been hampered by fears that banks which deal in securities will
be discriminated against compared with non-bank investment firms.
However, there has been some success recently in reaching a common position on this Proposed Directive which achieves a relatively
"level playing field" in terms of the capital requirements applicable
to both banks and non-banks.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that considerable progress has been made to date in
the adoption of measures to move the banking sector towards the
creation of a unified banking market. However, it is still unknown
whether Member States will be prepared to cooperate in the area of
closer coordination of economic and monetary policy, and how the
reciprocity measures with third countries will work in practice. It is
certainly possible that the controversy surrounding the issue of economic and monetary union and its implications on national sovereignty may hamper further progress in the banking sector by souring
relations between Member States. As far as the Proposed Directive
on Investment Services and the Proposed Directive on Capital Adequacy are concerned, it is apparent that neither will be implemented
at the same time as the Second Banking Directive, as was originally
contemplated, and that both may, indeed, be subject to further
negotiation.

